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INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, there has been a marked increase in state laws regulating
abortion in this country. For example, whereas in 1988 only 13 states required paren-
tal notification before a minor could obtain abortion, at present all but 9 states have
that requirement. In 1976 the Congress passed the Hyde Amendment which cut off
Federal funding of abortion for Medicaid recipients except in life threatening cases,
thus leaving the choice of making such funds available entirely to the states. At present,
16 states fund all abortions sought by Medicaid recipients, 32 states only fund abor-
tions resulting from rape or incest or life-threatening pregnancies, and 2 states only
fund abortions in case of life-threatening pregnancies. In addition, 15 states have
placed various restrictions on private insurance coverage of abortion procedures.
Each additional regulation increases the cost of an abortion and hence the oppor-
tunity cost of engaging in sex when a pregnancy is not desired. A substantial litera-
ture in economics has investigated whether the above restrictions affect the number
of abortions obtained, particularly by minors, and the results largely indicate that
restrictions do reduce such abortions. In contrast, whether the restrictions affect the
antecedents of pregnancy – namely sexual activity and contraception use among mi-
nors – remains a relatively unexplored issue. Yet, this is without doubt an important
issue. Adolescent pre-marital sexual activity is among the leading social problems in
the USA. Statistics from the Alan Guttmacher Institute indicate that currently about
3 million teenagers – 25 percent of all sexually active adolescents — contract a sexu-
ally transmitted disease every year, and about 1 million teenage women – 11 percent
of the total population of women between 15-19 years – experience an unplanned
pregnancy every year. Adolescent childbearing is more common in USA than compa-
rable developed nations like Great Britain, France, Canada and Sweden [Darroch,  et
al., 2001]. Hence, while policies promoting abstinence or responsible sexual behavior
among adolescents are desirable, the question becomes whether state regulations
restricting abortion actually contribute towards achieving that end. If the restrictions314 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
are effective in reducing access to legal abortion but not effective in reducing acciden-
tal pregnancies via promoting ‘safe’ sexual behavior among adolescent women, then
there is cause for concern, because this may increase the demand for illegal abortions,
or increase incidences of premature and unwanted motherhood with the potential for
substantial economic and psychological costs for both mother and child.
To this author’s knowledge, there exist only three papers in the current literature
[Argys, Averett & Rees, 2002; Levine, 2001;2003] that directly consider the issue of
state abortion restrictions on young women’s sexual and contraception behavior. This
work aims to add to that body of literature. Moreover, this work is first that considers
frequency of sexual activity, as well as non-contracepted sexual activity, among ado-
lescent women rather than simply the binary choice of being sexually active or not
active.
The next section briefly reviews existing literature related to the impact of exist-
ing restrictions on abortion, as well as existing literature on adolescent sexual activ-
ity. Section 3 describes the model and the data. Section 4 reviews and discusses the
results, and suggests some directions for future research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The issues of interest pertaining to the effects of abortion restrictions on adoles-
cent behavior are whether such restrictions actually reduce the number of abortions
performed, and whether they deter the kind of behavior that leads to accidental preg-
nancies in the first place. The literature on the effect of state abortion restrictions on
demand for abortion by adolescents may be divided into two broad categories. The
first category considers temporal changes in abortion rates among minors at the state
level following a restriction being effected. For example, Oshfeldt and Gohmann [1994]
consider the effect of parental involvement laws, Kane and Staiger [1996] consider the
effect of Medicaid funding restrictions, and Haas-Wilson [1996] considers the effect of
both of the above on reported teen abortion rates in the state. The consensus is that
restrictions do reduce teen abortion rates. The second category of studies uses indi-
vidual level data to investigate whether abortion restrictions in the state of residence
affect how young women resolve their pregnancies. Lundberg and Plotnick [1995] and
Levine,  et al. [1996] use NLSY79 data and find evidence that Medicaid funding restric-
tions negatively impact the probability of abortion. Joyce and Kaestner [1996] use data
from three states between 1986 and 1991, and find that parental involvement laws
reduce the probability of abortion among non-black minors in one state, but have no
effect in the other states. However, the literature on whether or not the restrictions
affect teen birth rates (which could provide evidence regarding whether abortion re-
strictions simultaneously deter pregnancy-risk behavior) yields extremely ambiguous
results. The literature on the effects of abortion restrictions on birth rates is summa-
rized in detail by Sen [2002a], and demonstrates that there is no clear consensus
across studies regarding whether the restrictions increase, fail to affect, or decrease
birth rates.
The next issue, then, is the direct effect of the restrictions on adolescent sexual
activity. Much of the literature regarding adolescents comes from disciplines other315 FREQUENCY OF SEXUAL ACTIVITY: DO STATE POLICIES MATTER?
than economics. The focus is on age of first initiation into sexual activity and contra-
ception use at first intercourse (rather than contemporary sexual and contraception
behavior), and the role played by socio-demographic characteristics and environmen-
tal influences in deciding age of sexual initiation. A review of this literature is avail-
able in Moore,  et al. [1995]. The emphasis is on the process of socialization of atti-
tudes regarding sex, and how familial and environmental factors affect perceptions
regarding ‘appropriate’ sexual behavior.1
In contrast to sociological models, the economic viewpoint emphasizes rationality,
and decision making using the cost-benefit approach. According to this viewpoint, an
adolescent woman’s decision to participate in sexual intercourse and non-contracepted
sexual intercourse should be made by weighing the benefits of such an activity (like
physical gratification) against the costs of such activity – the most notable being the
opportunity cost of an unwanted pregnancy in terms of lost educational, earnings and
lifestyle opportunities. Easy access to abortion prevent the consequences of an un-
wanted pregnancy from being long-lasting, thus lowering the cost of (non-contracepted)
sexual intercourse. Accordingly, restrictions that make abortion more inaccessible or
costly increase the opportunity cost of sexual intercourse, and should therefore de-
crease one or both of participation in intercourse per se and participation in inter-
course without contraception. This leads to the conjecture that, other factors equal,
adolescent women residing in states with more abortion restrictions should be less
prone to engaging in sexual intercourse than their counterparts in states with fewer
restrictions. Alternately, there should be reductions in the propensity of adolescents
within a state to engage in sexual activity following the passage of a new abortion
restriction.
As mentioned before, I am aware of only three papers in the literature [Argys,
Averett & Rees, 2002; Levine, 2001; 2003] that consider the direct impact of abortion
restrictions on adolescent sexual behavior. The papers by Levine adopt the within-
state approach. In the first study, the author uses data from the Youth Risk Behavior
Survey (YRBS) for 1991, 1993, 1995 and 1997 and estimates binary models with state
and year fixed effects for whether the respondent had sexual intercourse in the last
three months, and if so, whether contraception was used. The restrictions of interest
are availability of Medicaid funding for ‘non-emergency’ abortions, parental involve-
ment laws, and mandatory waiting periods, and none are found to have a significant
effect. The disadvantages are that YRBS includes very few individual level character-
istics, and more importantly, that a very limited number of actual changes in restric-
tions occur within the first and last survey year. In only three, seven and six states
are changes observed between 1991 and 1997 in Medicaid funding, parental involve-
ment and mandatory waiting periods, respectively. Such limited within-state variabil-
ity is, of course, a handicap in a model with state fixed effects and may be one reason
why Levine finds no evidence of the restrictions affecting adolescent sexual behavior.
In the second study, the author uses data from National Survey of Family Growth
(NSFG) from 1988 and 1995. The author reports that the results are “generally weak,
with little systematic pattern in the coefficients.” However, while there is no evidence
that parental involvement reduces sexual intercourse per se, it appears to have a316 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
negative effect, with a p-value of about 0.08, on the probability of not using contracep-
tion at time of last intercourse.
Argys,  et al. employ a cross sectional model data on 15 -19 year olds from the
NSFG 1995, and binary models of sexual intercourse and contraception use at last
intercourse. Results show no effect of Medicaid restrictions on either sexual inter-
course or contraception use. Parental notification laws have a weak, positive effect on
contraception use, but the results are not robust to inclusion of various county level
controls.
A shared feature of the above studies is that they consider the discrete choice of
whether or not to be sexually active at all over a certain period. Hence, they do not
distinguish between adolescents who engaged in sex on a regular basis and those who
may have had a single, chance sexual encounter in that period. In the area of contra-
ception, Argys,  et al. and Levine [2002] consider the probability of contraception use
at the last sexual encounter only, while Levine [2001] separately considers the prob-
ability of contraception use at the first intercourse ever and most recent intercourse.
It may be that the effects of state abortion restrictions operate in part through the
frequency of sexual intercourse and/or non-contracepted intercourse that adolescents
choose to indulge in. Hence, models that go beyond the binary choice of being sexually
active at all, and consider the issue of frequency of sexual intercourse and non-
contracepted intercourse, may be useful.
DATA AND MODEL
I employ data from the first round of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth,
1997 (hereafter NLSY97). The NLSY97 was initiated in 1997, with a sample of 6,748
respondents representative of the U.S. population who were aged 12-16 years on Dec.
31, 1996, and a supplemental over-sample of 2236 Hispanic and black people of the
same age group. A self-administered section of the survey asks all respondents who
were 14 or older as of December 31, 1996 about their sexual behavior and contracep-
tion use history. Respondents are asked whether they have ever had sexual inter-
course, whether and, if so, how frequently they have had sexual intercourse in the 12
months preceding the survey, the regularity of contraception use during intercourse,
and the most frequently used method of contraception. In addition, respondents 15
and older as of December 31, 1996 are asked about their expectations about the future
in terms of educational attainment. I use the sub-sample of never-married female
respondents aged 15 or more in this study. The final sample size is 1724 respondents.
The NLSY97 provides extensive information on socio-demographic characteristics of
all respondents as well as their state of residence. This makes it possible to incorpo-
rate state level characteristics, including abortion restrictions that affect the ‘cost’ of
sexual activity. The hypothesis of interest is whether, other things equal, adolescent
women residing in states that restrict Medicaid funding for abortions and that have
laws requiring parental involvement before a minor can obtain abortion engage in
sexual intercourse per se and non-contracepted sexual intercourse less frequently
than their counterparts in states without those restrictions.
The appropriate empirical model for sexual intercourse has to take into account
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pate in sexual intercourse a discrete number of times, which includes ‘zero times’ for
those who did not participate in intercourse in that period. Given that the frequency of
sexual intercourse can only take non-negative integer values, count-data models seem
more appropriate than conventional regression models that implicitly assume that
the dependent variable is continuous, though these models were also later estimated
as part of specification tests. Sexual behavior is likely to be influenced by a vector of
individual, county and state level observables as well as some unobservable character-
istics. Furthermore, if respondents report not being sexually active in that designated
time (that is, zero sexual encounters), then this can be due to any one of two underly-
ing reasons: (1) that the respondent has previously been, or is prepared to be, sexually
active, but simply happened to be celibate in the past 12 months; (2) that the respon-
dent reports abstinence because she would not choose to engage in sexual activity at
this stage of her life at all. The appropriate model that can incorporate all the above is
the zero inflated negative binomial model.
The assumption is that there are underlying dichotomous variables D1…..DN which
denote whether or not the respondent is willing to be sexually active, with p1, p2 … pN-
denoting the probabilities that the respondent is not willing to be sexually active at
this life-stage (that is, Di =0). When Di is 0, the corresponding explained variable Yi
(frequency of sexual intercourse in preceding 12 months) automatically takes the value
of zero. When Di is 1, the corresponding explained Yi follows an independent negative
binomial distribution (though Yi may still take the value of 0) with parameter λi,
where
(1) ln . λβ ε ii X = ′ +
Xi is the vector of observables and ε captures unobservable heterogeneity. Exp(ε) fol-
lows a gamma distribution with mean 1 and variance ν2.2 Therefore
(2) Prob( | ) ( ) ( ) Yp p R ii i i == + − 01 0 ε














It is assumed that the underlying dichotomous variable Di is normally distributed, and
(5) Prob( ) ( ). Dp X ii i === ′ 0 Φ τβ
Thus, the assumption is that there is a strong relation between the way in which
observables affect the value of Yi and how they affect the corresponding probability pi.3318 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
 The modeling of non-contracepted sex is more challenging. Contraception use
has typically been approached via one of three methods in the existing literature. The
first method considers only the behavior of the sexually active sub-sample, a method
that implicitly assumes that the contraception decision is made only after the decision
to be sexually active is made and thereby ignores the possible inter-dependency of the
two decisions. Studies that generalize from results pertaining to contraception behav-
ior among sub-samples of sexually active teens without considering the possible inter-
dependence of such behavior and the initial sexual activity [for example, Hogan, et al.,
1985] implicitly make that assumption. The second method acknowledges that the
sexually active sub-sample is a non-random selection of the full sample, and adopts a
sample selection correction method to account for this non-randomness [Moore,
Morrison & Glei, 1995; Argys et al., 2002]. Two problems with this method are that it
requires normally distributed error terms to construct the Mill’s ratio, as originally
described in Heckman [1979] and is therefore incompatible with a negative binomial
model, and also that it requires a valid identification restriction — in that there should
be at least one variable that affects the decision to be sexually active but not the
contraception decision. In reality, identifying a variable that can feasibly take this role
is often problematic. The final method treats the decisions of sexual activity and con-
traception use as effectively non-separable decisions, and estimates reduced form
models. This method is adopted by Brewster [1994], who estimates separate hazard
models for the risk of experiencing a contracepted first intercourse by a certain age,
and a non-contracepted first intercourse by a certain age. It is also used by Rees, et al.
[2001] and Sen [2002b] when testing the effects of alcohol use on non-contracepted
sexual activity. This is the approach that I adopt here. Accordingly, the explained
variable, Zi, now becomes the number of incidences of intercourse without any effec-
tive form of contraception in the last 12 months. The zero inflated negative binomial
model is again adopted to account for the fact that an observation of zero incidences of
non-contracepted sexual intercourse could arise from the fact that 1) the respondent
is not averse to non-contracepted intercourse but simply did not participate in it dur-
ing this time period; 2) the respondent would never participate in non-contracepted
intercourse.4 Again, there is an underlying dichotomous variable Gi, which is nor-
mally distributed and takes the value 0 with probability qi. If Gi is 0, then the observed
variable Zi automatically takes the value 0. If Gi is 1, then Zi follows independent,
negative binomial distribution with parameter γi. Also,
(6) ln , γα ii Xu = ′ +
where exp(u) follows a gamma distribution with mean 1 and variance s2, and
qG I X ii i == = ′ Prob( , ) ( ). 0 Φ κα
Precise formulations of likelihood functions are available from the author upon re-
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In addition, I run estimations for non-contracepted sex using the sexually active
sub-sample only. This is a useful specification test, but it must be kept in mind that
due to the potentially non-random nature of the sexually active sub-sample, these
results may not be generalized to the full sample.
In accordance with much of the existing literature, I include in Xi measures of
physical maturity, familial structure, demographic characteristics, income, religion,
environmental characteristics and so forth. In addition, I include measures of the
state abortion policies of interest. A problem posed here, as with all cross-sectional
studies of this nature, is that state abortion policies are likely to be correlated with
unobservable beliefs and attitudes of the state’s population, which may in turn influ-
ence the sexual behavior of teens residing in the state. Examples are, the degree of
conservatism among the state population, their attitudes towards traditional family
values, religiosity, sympathy towards women having reproductive ‘choice,’ and so forth.
Barring availability of longitudinal panel data-sets with the required information on
teen sexual activity that also have sufficient within-state variation in policies so as to
permit using state fixed-effects and perhaps state-specific time trends, there is no
‘perfect’ way to control for this problem of unobservables and the bias they may cause
in estimates of the effects of abortion policies. Though at the time of this study, mul-
tiple waves of the NLSY97 data were available, they do not help alleviate the problem,
for there were extremely few changes in relevant state abortion policies over this
time period. Hence, were the models re-estimated using multiple waves of data and
state fixed effects, the policies’ effects would be almost entirely subsumed in the state
fixed effects.5 However, one way to partially circumvent this problem in cross-sec-
tional data is to do specification tests where additional state-level observables that can
instrument unobservable state attitudes are included, and inspect whether the effects
of the state abortion policies are robust to the inclusion of these instruments.
Xi contains the following: race (1 if black); ethnicity (1 if Hispanic, and also 1 if a
language other than English is spoken at home); age; whether the respondent has
attained menarche; a religious dummy indicates whether the respondent is affiliated
to a religion that has published statements condemning abortion;6 whether the re-
spondent resides with both biological/adoptive parents; whether there is a strict fa-
ther (or father figure) in the household; whether there is a strict mother (or mother
figure) in the household; three binary indicators of family income (whether family
income is greater than 5 times the poverty level, whether family income is at or below
poverty level, whether family income information is missing); residence in an urban
area; the respondent’s highest grade completed in school adjusted for age;7 the prob-
ability with which the respondent believes she will complete a college degree by age 30;
and state policies. The primary state policies of interest are whether the state allows
Medicaid funding for abortion procedures (1 if funding is available), and whether the
state has a law enforcing parental involvement before a minor can obtain an abortion
(1 if law exists). As discussed previously, one way to distinguish the effects of the
policies from the effects of state-level unobservables that might influence both the
policies and teen sexual behavior is to re-estimate the model with additional state-
level controls. Accordingly, in the first robustness test, I also include whether the320 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
state has in place a policy that restricts insurance coverage for abortion procedures,8
whether the state education agency requires sex and AIDS education in public schools,
the maximum monthly AFDC payment available to a family of four, and the AIDS rate
per 100,000 population. Note that these policies are included primarily to capture
state-level attitudes; their direct effect on teen sexual behavior is not of primary inter-
est in this paper. In the second robustness test, I include in addition a binary indicator
for whether the state had liberalized abortion laws prior to Roe vs. Wade,9 state di-
vorce rates per 1000 population in 1996, and a dummy for whether the state is in the
South.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS & DISCUSSION
Of the 1724 respondents in my final sample, 456 (approximately 19 percent of all
15 year olds, 29 percent of all 16 year olds, and 33.5 percent of all 17 year olds) report
having been sexually active in the 12 months preceding the survey. Table 1 gives the
distribution of frequency of sexual intercourse, and Table 2 gives the distribution of
the frequency of non-contracepted intercourse.10 Note that about 50 percent of the
sexually active sub-sample report at least one incidence of unprotected sexual inter-
course, and about 10 percent of the sexually active sub-sample report more than 25
incidents of unprotected intercourse in the preceding 12 months. This indicates that
many adolescents expose themselves to the risk of pre-marital pregnancy with dis-
turbing frequency.
TABLE 1
Distribution of Frequency of Sexual Intercourse in Previous 12 Months.
Frequency Number of Percentage Percentage
Sexual Intercourse Respondents (Full) (Sexually Active)
0 1268 73.55
1 to 5 159 9.23 34.87
6 to 10 80 4.64 17.54
11 to 20 76 4.41 16.67
21-50 67 3.88 14.71
51-100 29 1.7 6.37
More than 100 45 2.62 9.87
Total 1724 100 100
Notes: The sample consists of never-married adolescent females aged 15-17 as of December 31, 1996
from the first wave of the NLSY97. Column 3 gives percentages of full sample. Column 4 gives
percentages of sub-sample who were sexually active in last 12 months.
Table 3 presents means and standard deviations of all variables for the full sample
and for the sexually active and non-active samples separately. Table 4 presents coeffi-
cients, t-statistics, and marginal effects calculated at the mean for the zero inflated
negative binomial model of sexual intercourse.11 The first three columns present re-
sults when only the two state restrictions on abortion are included in addition to
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the additional state characteristics described earlier. Table 5 presents corresponding
results for non-contracepted intercourse. The last set of columns in Table 5 includes
results for the sexually active sub-sample only.12
TABLE 2
Distribution of Frequency of Non-contracepted Sexual Intercourse
in Previous 12 Months.
Frequency Non- Number of Percentage Percentage
contracepted Intercourse Respondents (Full) (Sexually Active)
Sexually non-active 1268 73.55 —
0 226 13.11 49.56
1 to 2 61 3.56 13.39
3 to 5 48 2.8 10.53
6 to 10 36 2.09 7.9
11 to 25 35 2.06 7.7
26 to 100 37 2.19 8.14
More than 100 13 0.76 2.85
Total 1724 100 100
Notes: Intercourse with highly ineffective methods like withdrawal are included among non-contracepted
intercourse. About 5 percent of the sexually active sample report relying on such methods. Column 3
gives percentages of full sample. Column 4 gives percentages of sub-sample who were sexually active
in last 12 months.
Like most of the existing literature on adolescent sexual activity, results in Table
4 indicate that that older respondents have sex more frequently, respondents living
with both natural /adopted parents and those with a strict mother figure at home have
sex less frequently. Respondents who have strong expectations of completing college
by age 30 have sex less frequently. This is consistent with the theory of opportunity
costs, and may also indicate a negative relationship between innate intelligence/abil-
ity and propensity to have sex during adolescence. Being black or Hispanic does not
appear to have any significant impact on frequency of sexual intercourse. This non-
effect of race after family income and family structure are controlled for is in keeping
with results from other studies like Brewster [1994]. The effects of family income is
somewhat surprising, in that while adolescents from wealthy families appear to be
less likely to have sexual intercourse than the control group, so do adolescents from
poor families – though in the latter case, the effects are smaller and have weaker
statistical significance. Religious beliefs and urban residence have the expected signs,
but are statistically insignificant.
It is interesting to compare some of the results pertaining to the frequency of
sexual intercourse per se with those pertaining to frequency of non-contracepted in-
tercourse (Table 5). For instance, age has insignificantly positive effects when using
the full sample and insignificantly negative effects for the sexually active sub-sample,
suggesting that while older adolescents are more likely to be sexually active, younger
adolescents are no less likely to have non-contracepted sex conditional on being sexu-
ally active. Similarly, while a foreign language spoken at home had no effect on sexual
intercourse per se, it has a positive effect on non-contracepted intercourse in one of322 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
TABLE 3
Means and Standard Deviations for Independent Variables
Variables Description Full Not Sexually Sexually
Sample Active Active
(N = 1724) (N = 1268) (N = 456)
BLACK Black 0.282 0.256 0.355
(0.40) (0.43) (0.48)
FORLANG Foreign language at home 0.167 0.188 0.106
(0.37) (0.39) (0.31)
HISP Hispanic 0.197 0.213 0.151
(0.39)  (0.41)  (0.36)
AGE Age 15.78 15.74 15.90
(0.69)  (0.69) (0.68)
MENARCHE Attained menarche 0.974 0.969 0.987
(0.16) (0.17) (0.11)
FUNDRELG Member of religious denomination 0.634 0.634 0.634
opposing abortion (0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
STRICTM Strict mother /mother figure in 0.493 0.521 0.414
household (0.50) (0.500) (0.493)
STRICTF Strict father / father figure in household 0.493 0.461 0.331
household (0.49) (0.50) (0.47)
RICHHH Household Income >=5 times 0.101 0.117 0.054
poverty level (0.30) (0.32) (0.22)
POORHH Household Income < poverty level 0.153 0.142 0.184
(0.36) (0.34) (0.38)
TWOPAR Lives with both natural/adoptive parents 0.497 0.549 0.351
(0.50) (0.49) (0.47)
MISSHH Household Income missing 0.303 0.305 0.295
 (0.45) (0.48) (0.45)
URBAN Residence in Urban Area 0.592 0.588 0.606
(0.49) (0.49) (0.48)
CHCOLL Self-reported expected % chance 77.07 80.63 67.19
of college degree (30.24) (27.96) (33.94)
ADJHGC Highest Grade Completed 9.223 9.215 9.247
(adjusted for age) (1.03) (1.02) (1.07)
MEDFUND Medicaid funding available for abortion 0.373 0.380 0.353
(0.48) (0.48) (0.47)
PARINVOLV Enforced Parental involvement laws 0.244 0.238 0.261
(0.43) (0.42) (0.43)
NOINS Restrictions on private insurance 0.042 0.043 0.036
(0.19) (0.20) (0.18)
AIDS AIDS per 100,000 of population. 26.19 26.64 24.94
(18.92) (19.64) (16.74)
SEX_ED Mandated AIDS & Sex education. 0.542 0.540 0.546
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
MAXAFDC State Max monthly AFDC payments 455.5 461.8 436.3
to family of 4 (180.5) (182.6) (178.9)
LIBABOR State liberated Abortion laws prior 0.398 0.406 0.371
to Roe vs. Wade (0.48) (0.49) (0.48)
SOUTH State is in South 0.373 0.363 0.405
(0.48) (0.48) (0.49)
DIV96 Divorce Rate in State 4.908 4.886 5.024
(per 1000 population) (3.30) (2.88)  (3.42)
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis.323 FREQUENCY OF SEXUAL ACTIVITY: DO STATE POLICIES MATTER?
the models with the full sample, and in the model with only the sexually active sub-
sample, suggesting that adolescents from such households who are sexually active
may be less knowledgeable about or less able to access contraception. Belonging to a
religious denomination forbidding abortion was not found to significantly decrease
frequency of sexual intercourse, but it appears to decrease frequency of non-
contracepted intercourse. Family income level or family structure does not by and
large affect the frequency of non-contracepted intercourse significantly.
Regarding the two policy variables of primary interest, I find that the presence of
Medicaid funding restrictions or parental involvement laws appear to affect neither
sexual intercourse per se nor non-contracepted intercourse with statistical signifi-
cance. In fact, the sign on the effect of Medicaid funding restrictions is sensitive to the
inclusion of other state level variables, and it is actually counter-logical before the
additional state variables are included. Afterwards, availability of funding has the
expected sign, but falls well short of statistical significance. The effect of parental
involvement laws has the expected sign, but nonetheless falls somewhat short of the
10 percent level of significance in all model specifications. In lieu of state-fixed-effects,
I ran additional specifications where an interaction between Medicaid funding avail-
ability and the binary indicator of family income being at/below poverty level was
included in all models. Arguably, while state-effects are relevant for all respondents,
Medicaid funding restrictions are relevant only for respondents for low income fami-
lies. Thus this helps show whether there are differences in the effects of Medicaid
funding restrictions for respondents from poor families and respondents from all other
families, assuming that state-effects are constant across the two groups.13 However,
the interaction term continued to be statistically insignificant (and its sign was sensi-
tive to the model specification). This provided further evidence of the failure of Medic-
aid funding restrictions to notably affect sexual activity or contraception use. These
results are available upon request.
The effects of some of the other state-level controls are noteworthy. Restrictions
on insurance coverage on abortion procedures have a negative association with fre-
quency of non-contracepted sex for the full sample (though it is insignificant for the
sub-sample only). While this may simply be an artifact of unobserved state attitudes
that variable is capturing, it may also be speculated that such a restriction on insur-
ance policies serves as an incentive for parents to speak to their children about sex
and contraception so as to avoid accidental pregnancies (an abortion procedure that
does not require hospitalization costs about $400-$600 — which, while not prohibitive
for non-poor families, might still give added incentives to parents to talk to their
children about avoiding unwanted pregnancies). Since this restriction is not of pri-
mary interest, I do not delve into this further, but it suggests an interesting direction
for future research. Also, interestingly, higher maximum monthly AFDC payments
are associated with less frequent sexual activity. While the result contradicts conven-
tional economic theory, there are related precedents in the literature. Previous work
by Duncan and Hoffman [1990] find that higher AFDC benefits did not increase out-of-
wedlock teen births among black women, and Schultz [1994] finds that not only did
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24, but it inexplicably decreased such births among non-black women in the same age
group. Along a related line, Levine [2001] finds that adolescents residing in states that
have reformed their welfare system to make obtaining benefits more difficult are
actually more likely to be sexually active than their counterparts in other states.
Levine suggests the possibility that welfare reforms are endogenous to the fertility
behavior of adolescents in the state. Similarly, it could be conjectured that, in this
case, per family welfare payments are endogenous to the size of the current caseload
or potential future caseload. States where teen sexual and fertility behavior are con-
ducive to keeping the potential welfare caseload low may be inclined to be more gen-
erous.14 Nonetheless, the result seems unexpected enough to warrant further re-
search in the future.
One issue of concern is whether the two abortion policies of primary interest –
Medicaid funding availability and parental involvement laws — are sufficiently strongly
correlated so that both appear insignificant due to multicollinearity. If the states which
enforce parental involvement systematically fail to provide Medicaid funding and vice
versa, then the correlation coefficient between the two policy indicators in my sample
is close to -1, which is a potential problem. To inspect this, I re-ran the equations
alternately including only the binary indicator parental involvement law and only the
availability of Medicaid funding. Even then, neither was found to be statistically sig-
nificant. Moreover, the correlation coefficient between presence of a parental involve-
ment law and availability of Medicaid funding in the sample is -0.289. The negative
sign is expected, but the magnitude does not seem large enough to cause serious
multicollinearity concerns.
I attempted certain other specifications, whose results are available upon request.
I experimented with including additional state level controls, like female labor force
participation, the ratio of female to male unemployment rates in the state, state pov-
erty rates, percentage of adolescents ‘in need’ who were able to obtain contraception
from publicly funded clinics, and whether the state provided police protection around
abortion clinics. This information is available from the Alan Guttmacher Institute.
However, including these did not change the lack of statistical significance of Medicaid
restrictions and parental involvement. I also re-estimated the frequency of sexual
activity and non-contracepted sexual activity using regular negative binomial models
(instead of zero-inflated), as well as Tobit models. The results were qualitatively the
same, in that in no case did either parental involvement laws or Medicaid restrictions
have any statistically significant negative effects. Finally, I ran estimations using
standard probit models for binary indicators of ‘had any sexual activity or not’ and ‘had
any non-contracepted sexual activity or not’, and Tobit models for frequency of sexual
activity and frequency of non-contracepted sexual activity. In all cases, the effects of
the two abortion restrictions of interest turned out to be statistically insignificant.
In conclusion, I do not find support for the hypothesis that Medicaid funding re-
strictions reduces sexual intercourse or non-contracepted intercourse among adoles-
cents. Parental involvement laws have a consistently negative sign but fall short of
being statistically significant at 10 percent level. Hence, it appears that they also fail
to discernibly reduce sexual intercourse or non-contracepted intercourse among ado-
lescents. The question then becomes, how might one interpret these non-effects? One327 FREQUENCY OF SEXUAL ACTIVITY: DO STATE POLICIES MATTER?
reason could be the failure to control adequately for unobservable state effects in spite
of the inclusion of other state-level policies and characteristics. Bias arising from
failure to control for such unobservables may operate in two ways. The first and more
plausible case is that the more religiously or socially conservative states have more
restrictive abortion policies. In such cases, the estimated effects of the policies would
be biased away from zero – namely, they would appear to affect sexual activity and
unprotected sexual activity more strongly and significantly than is true, hence in-
creasing the risk of type I error. This would be a concern if I found the policies of
interest to have significant non-zero effects on teen sexual behavior. However, given
that I already fail to reject the null hypothesis of ‘no effect’ for the restrictions of
interest, the presence of this form of bias in my model does not qualitatively change
my conclusions. The second and less plausible case is that states with otherwise rela-
tively ‘non-traditional’ norms and attitudes and a propensity among teens to engage in
premarital sexual activity choose to impose restrictive abortion policies as a form of
deterrence. In this case, the state unobservables could cause the estimated effects of
the policies to be biased towards zero, increasing the risk of type II error. Evidence
seems to support the first case, because among the fifteen states that had made abor-
tion accessible even before Roe versus Wade, the great majority did not have a paren-
tal involvement law in place, and a higher proportion of this group of states provided
Medicaid funding for abortion than did the other states (more specific details are avail-
able upon request from the author). Thus, it seems that current permissive (restric-
tive) abortion policies are positively correlated with historically liberal (conservative)
attitudes in the state, especially with regards to sexual activity and reproductive rights.
This helps alleviate concerns about whether the paper’s main findings are spurious.
 Multiple explanations might be given for the non-effects of abortion policies on
teen sexual behavior. One explanation could be the tendency among adolescents to
discount the future at very high rates, so that the ‘price’ of abortion and future conse-
quences thereof do not enter present decisions about sexual activity and contracep-
tion use. Note that if this is the case, then the desirability of the policies become
somewhat debatable, for it indicates that the policies will do little to prevent the initial
occurrence of unwanted pregnancies among adolescents. Hence, there is the risk that
they will lead to more cases of unplanned teen motherhood or of cases of adolescent
women trying to obtain abortion in illegal and health-endangering manners. An alter-
nate explanation is that, on average, the restrictions on abortion access are non-
binding. If most adolescents are not averse to letting their parents know of an acci-
dental pregnancy and are willing to discuss the option of an abortion with them, and if
most adolescents are either not eligible for or do not plan to use Medicaid funding for
abortion procedures anyway, then the above restrictions will not be binding constraints
and hence will not affect sexual behavior. Nor should they later affect the demand for
abortion among adolescents in this generation who experience an unwanted preg-
nancy. In that case, while the policies do no harm, but at the same time they are
essentially meaningless. A final explanation might be the lack of information. It is not
clear what mechanisms different states have in place to inform adolescents regarding
the presence of the above restrictions. If adolescents are simply unaware of the re-
strictions, then they will not factor them into the potential cost of sexual activity.328 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Hence, an initial direction of policy might be to ensure that adolescents are made
aware of the existence of the regulations, through school programs or through public
service messages on the media. If the regulations serve as binding constraints for
most adolescents and if most adolescents are rational enough to consider future con-
sequences of current actions, then lack of information regarding the existence of the
restrictions may be what prevents the restrictions from having negative effects on the
frequency of sexual intercourse (non-contracepted intercourse). Therefore, better dis-
semination of information might serve as a useful remedy.
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1. The factors systematically found to be correlated with early initiation into sex are structure of
parental family, poverty, physical maturity, religiosity and church attendance, use of addictive
substances, dating young, and sexual attitudes of friends, siblings and parents. Similar character-
istics are found to play an important role in contraception use. However, from the economist’s
point of view, there are endogeneity issues with many of these variables, and the direction of
causality between these variables and sexual activity/contraception behavior is uncertain. The
more obvious suspects are substance use, dating young, church attendance, school performance
and the sexual attitudes of self-selected friends (for more on this issue, see Levine, [2001]).
2. If ν2
 = 0, then the negative binomial distribution resorts to the standard Poisson distribution with
equal mean and variance. ν2
 ≠ 0 gives rise to the ‘overdispersion’ in negative binomial models.
3. One referee raised concerns about the relatively restrictive form of the model, where it is assumed
that pi= Φ(τβ′Xi ). A more general non-restrictive form would just be pi = Φ(ζ′X2 ). However, in
practice, this unrestricted form also requires an identification restriction, with there being at least
one variable in X2 that is not in X1. It is extremely difficult to find a variable that will feasibly affect
willingness to be or not be sexually active (i.e. whether or not Di = 0), but will not thereafter affect
the frequency of sexual intercourse. Attempts to estimate an unrestricted ZINB model without
the identification restriction resulted in failure of the model to converge both in STATA and
LIMDEP. Accordingly, I have chosen to go with the restricted version.
4. An admitted shortcoming is that no further distinction can be made between those who are not
averse to being sexually active at this life stage but are averse to non-contracepted sexual inter-
course, and those who simply would not participate in sexual intercourse – non-contracepted or
otherwise – at this life stage. A structural model that can incorporate these aspects is beyond the
scope of this paper.
5. Specifically, four waves of the NLSY97 data were available at on-set of this work, from 1997 to
2000. However, to this author’s knowledge, there were no changes to state Medicaid funding
restriction laws in this period. Parental involvement laws were imposed in Texas (1999). They
were passed in Colorado (1998) and Florida (1999) but not enforced in either state, so are unlikely
to have much effect. They were also passed in New Jersey (1998) but almost immediately enjoined
by court order.
6. The denominations are obtained from Haas-Wilson [1996]. They include Roman catholic Church,
Eastern Orthodox Churches, Churches of Christ, the American Baptist Association, the Lutheran
Church-Missouri Synod, African Methodist Churches, Christian Churches, Assemblies of God,
and Churches of Jesus Christ of Latter day Saints.329 FREQUENCY OF SEXUAL ACTIVITY: DO STATE POLICIES MATTER?
7. Since most respondents are currently in school, their grade depends on their current age. Hence,
the variable used is (Highest grade completed + 5 – Age).
8. Idaho, Kentucky, Missouri and North Dakota only allow abortion coverage through optional
riders which require separate, additional premiums. Rhode Island enjoins the same. Colorado,
Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Vir-
ginia explicitly prohibit insurance coverage whenever public funds are used or public employees
are insured. Exceptions are made in most cases when abortion is required to preserve the woman’s
life, and in some cases when the pregnancy is a result of rape or incest. Those details are available
upon request. The extent of the direct effect of these policies on adolescent behavior is question-
able since adolescents are covered by their parents’ insurance, and would not be able to make use
of the insurance coverage if they did not wish to let their parents know about the abortion anyway.
However, the presence of this restriction should be indicative of the state’s public opinion about
abortion.
9. Fifteen states had adopted laws making abortion relatively easy to obtain before the Roe vs Wade
ruling — CA, NY, HI, WA, KS, NM, OR, CO, VA, MD, SC, NC, DE, AK and AR.
10. Details about choice of contraception method are not presented here. Briefly, condoms were
found to be the contraception of choice among more than 60% of the sexually active group,
followed by the pill, which was preferred by about 14%. A total of 5% of the sexually active sample
reported depending on unsafe methods like withdrawal and rhythm, and I count such encounters
among ‘non-contracepted intercourse.’
11. Finally, the high values of the Vuong statistics indicate that the zero inflated model is to be favored
against the regular (non zero-inflated) model. The negative value of τ indicates that (not surpris-
ingly) variables that increase the predicted frequency of engaging in sex also decrease the probabil-
ity that the respondent will prefer to abstain from sex altogether at this life-stage.
12. In the case where only the sexually active sub-sample is considered, the zero values may be either
because the respondent would simply not participate in non-contracepted sex, or because she
happened not to participate in it during the previous year.
13. I am grateful to one of the referees for this suggestion.
14. It could also be speculated that higher welfare payments lead to stronger negative feelings about
welfare recipients among the rest of the population. This may affect adolescents’ perceptions
about the ‘acceptability’ of going on welfare, and hence lead them to take precautions against such
an eventuality.
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